On Ethical Narratology

Tilmann Köppe

Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies, Freiburg im Breisgau

The claim that we need an ethical narratology has some initial plausibility in light of two more or less recent trends in literary studies. First, narratologists have programmatically proclaimed the need for, amongst others, a ‘feminist narratology,’ a ‘cultural narratology,’ or a ‘postcolonial narratology.’[1] Since all these strands of narratology evidently deal with matters of great ethical import, one may think that it is time to tackle the ethics of narrative head-on, using the tools and methods of a specialized narratology that is tailored for just this purpose. Second, we are faced with the diagnosis of an ‘ethical turn’ in literary criticism, which has been conceived of as a reaction to ‘formalistic’ trends in deconstruction and elsewhere.[2] Hence one may wish to give a systematic account – an ethical narratology, that is – of the tools and methods that have been developed within these critical practices.

Upon closer inspection, however, I do not think that the prospect of an ‘ethical narratology’ is all too promising. Let me explain why.

To begin with, we need a rough story about what ethics is. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy offers the following core entry: ‘The study of the concepts involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice. Also the second-order study of the objectivity, subjectivity, relativism, or skepticism that may attend claims made in these terms.’[3] Ethics, thus conceived, is a philosophical discipline that aims at clarifying the conceptual resources used in practical reasoning and investigates the validity of particular claims. Now let us suppose that this is a reasonable conception of what ethics is all about. What, then, could an ‘ethical narratology’ possibly be?

I think that there are several possibilities, some more plausible than others.

First, it might be tempting to think of ‘ethical narratology’ as a compound that works analogous to, say, ‘political theory.’ ‘Theory’ means, roughly, a system of statements on a particular subject, and ‘political’ specifies the particular subject in question. With ‘narratology,’ however, things are different: ‘narratology’ means theoretical study of narratives; the term thus already contains a qualification of a particular field of study. So one wonders what exactly ‘ethical’ is meant to refer to. Two possible referents include: the manner in which the studies are conducted (that is, narratologists studying in an ethical spirit), or the subclass of narratives under consideration (that is, ethical narratology is concerned with the theoretical study of ethical narratives only). These suggestions seem rather odd to me. 

Second, and perhaps more reasonably, one might say that ‘ethical narratology’ should be concerned with ethical aspects of narratives. This conception has the (rather obvious, I think) disadvantage that it is very inclusive. Any interpretation that brings out matters of ethical importance will count as ‘ethical narratology.’ Consequently, it should be hard to come up with an interpretation that does not belong within this field.

Third, narratology can be conceived of more narrowly. In particular, it has been claimed that it ought to be distinguished from both interpretation and the theory of interpretation.[4] According to this conception, narratology aims at the theoretical study and explication of the concepts used for the analysis of narratives, including their production, structure, forms, and functions. It is not concerned with the interpretation of narratives, but rather with the theoretical study and facilitation of categories and concepts that can be used for the analysis and interpretation of narratives. Note that narratology, thus conceived, has the same theoretical status as ethics; both narratology and ethics are higher-order enterprises, insofar as they do not make claims about particular actions or events (ethics) or narratives (narratology), but rather attempt to clarify the conceptual resources one needs in order to make such claims.[5]

Now this is a reasonable conception of narratology – but it has not brought us much closer to an agenda for ‘ethical narratology.’ I believe that, based on the narrow conception of narratology, we could conceive of an ‘ethical narratology’ in either of the following three ways:

First, we could say that ethical narratology clarifies not only the categories and concepts of narratives qua narratives, but also the categories and concepts of narratives qua entities of ethical significance. Thus an ‘ethical narratology’ simply has a broader scope than ordinary narratology, for it deals with ethical concepts in addition to the concepts tackled by ordinary narratology. I believe that this conception is somewhat arbitrary and, actually, silly. The term ‘ethical narratology,’ thus conceived, marks a rather heterogeneous field of research: it deals with either narrative or ethical concepts, just like a ‘household theory’ that deals with either households or theories.[6] What is more, philosophical ethics is a broad and sophisticated field that is not easily swallowed by narratology; any narratological investigation of ethical concepts is, I am afraid, likely to be rather shallow. (And, by the way, why should narratologists need to bother about the analysis of concepts such as ‘good’ or ‘duty’? They may consider the results of philosophical ethics instead.)

Second, we could say that at least some of the concepts narratology deals with are somehow ethically significant and therefore constitute the focus area of an ‘ethical narratology.’ An example might be the narrator who might be conceived of as a person whose character, actions or outlook are of some ethical import. It seems to me that once we start examining the ethical predicaments of some narrator or other, we are actually back in the business of interpretation. Remember that, according to the narrow conception of narratology, we are to deal with clarifying the concept of a narrator, not with narrators in actu, that is, with the particular narrator-figures of particular narrative texts. This is not to deny that the application of all kinds of narrative techniques serves all kinds of effects that may be deemed ethically significant in one way or the other. Still, it seems to me that figuring out the ethical significance of particular narrative techniques is a matter of interpretation, to be conducted on a case to case basis, and not a matter of conceptual clarification, that is, narratology.

Third, we could say that ‘ethical narratology’ is a mere façon de parler, meaning simply that on some occasions – that is, in order to facilitate the analyses of some aspects of (some) narratives – both narratology and ethics are helpful. Thus, an ‘ethical narratology’ is not a particular branch of narratology, but rather narratology in the service of particular ends, and in the company of ethics. In particular, it is convenient to think of narratology and ethics as providing a heuristics for the pursuits of these ends.[7] This, finally, is a conception I could live with. Let me close by enlisting some fields of inquiry where it might prove useful:

• Fictional characters and their actions are commonly assessed according to moral standards. While narratology tells us what a fictional character is, ethics tells us what is involved in calling some behavior good or bad. A joint adventure of narratology and ethics might help us to clarify the puzzling issues involved in, say, the ‘double status’ of fictional characters as both textual units and morally accountable persons, or the logic of moral predication over non-existent entities.[8]
• Some philosophers maintain that literary narratives can play an important part in the clarification of concepts, especially ethical ones.[9] Narratology might help to identify those aspects of stories that facilitate their propensity as tools for conceptual clarification.
• Some characteristics of practical thinking are closely connected to particular features of narratives: it has been argued that, for instance, perspective shifting and counterfactual storytelling play a crucial part in moral thinking,[10] or that children acquire their capacity for intention-attribution via narratives,[11] or that people try to enact the stories that make sense to them.[12] Obviously, the concepts tackled by narratology play a crucial role for these branches of ethical theory. The same holds true for the so-called ‘narrative identity thesis,’ i.e. the thesis that narrative is somehow involved in, or responsible for, maintaining a person’s identity.[13]
• Narrative fiction is often held to affect the moral capacities of its readers. One especially important way in which this can be done is the eliciting of ‘moral’ emotions like pity or shame.[14] Narratologists may inquire into the narrative techniques responsible for reader attitudes of the respective kinds, while philosophers examine the roles of emotion in ethics.
• Narratives are regularly assessed according to their aesthetic quality. It is a matter of controversial debate whether the ‘moral outlook’ of a narrative may be relevant for its aesthetic value.[15] Again, narratology and ethics might help to clarify the conceptual interrelations under dispute.

Of course, this is an open list. I have been concerned here only with fields of inquiry that might call for a collaboration of  narratology and ethics due to the particular nature of the problems at hand. There may be other motives for calling for an ethical narratology, to be sure. For instance, one may feel the need to keep up with all the others calling for an ‘xyz-narratology,’ or one may realize that interdisciplinary collaboration is en vogue, anyway, or one may sense that ‘ethical narratology’ has a ring to it that promises applicability and relevance beyond the academic ivory tower. I do not think that ethical narratology depends on such questionable motives any more than it depends on blurring the lines between narratology and interpretation.[16]

Works Cited

Bachorz, Stephanie 2004: Zur Analyse der Figuren. In: Einführung in die Erzähltextanalyse. Kategorien, Modelle, Probleme. Ed. by Peter Wenzel. Trier, 51-67.

Blackburn, Simon 1994: Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford/New York.

Carroll, Noël 2002: The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge“. In: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60, 3-26.

Diengott, Nilli 1988: Narratology and Feminism. In: Style 22, 42-51.

Fludernik, Monika 2005: Histories of Narrative Theory (II): From Structuralism to the Present. In: A Companion to Narrative Theory. Ed. by James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz. Malden, MA, 36-59.

Goldie, Peter 2007: Dramatic Ironie, Narrative, and the External Perspective. In: Narrative and Understanding Persons. Ed. by Daniel D. Hutto. Cambridge, 69-84.

Goldie, Peter 2009: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning. In: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67, 97-106.

Hutto, Daniel D. 2007: The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. In: Narrative and Understanding Persons. Ed. by Daniel D. Hutto. Cambridge, 43-68.

Jacobson, Daniel 1997: In Praise of Immoral Art. In:  Philosophical Topics 25, 155-199.

John, Eileen 1998: Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Thought in Literary Context. In: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, 331-348.

Kieran, Matthew 2001: In Defence of the Ethical Evaluation of Narrative Art. In: British Journal of Aesthetics 41, 26-38.

Kindt, Tom 2008: Back to Classical Narratology. Why Narrative Theory Should not Bother Too Much about the Narrative Turn. In: The Narrativist Turn and the Study of Literary Narrative, Narrativity, Fictionality, and Literariness. Ed. by Lars-Åke Skalin. Örebro 2008, 25-36.

Kindt, Tom/Köppe, Tilmann 2009: Das Selbst – eine Erzählung? In: Ambivalenz und Kohärenz. Ed. by Julia Abel, Andreas Blödorn and Michael Scheffel. Trier [forthcoming].

Kindt, Tom/Müller, Hans-Harald 2003: Narrative Theory and/or/as Theory of Interpretation. In: What Is Narratolgoy? Questions and Answers Regarding the Status of a Theory. Ed. By Tom Kindt and Hans-Harald Müller. Berlin/New York, 205-215. 

Köppe, Tilmann 2008: Was ist analytische Literaturtheorie? In: Derrida und danach? Literaturtheoretische Diskurse der Gegenwart. Ed. by Gregor Thuswaldner. Wiesbaden, 67-83.

Köppe, Tilmann 2008a: Literatur und Erkenntnis. Studien zur kognitiven Signifikanz fiktionaler literarischer Werke. Paderborn.

Korthals-Altes, Liesbeth 20004: Ethical Turn. In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory. Ed. by David Herman and Marie-Laure Ryan. London, 142-146.

Lamarque, Peter 2003: How to Create a Fictional Character. In: The Creation of Art. New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics. Ed. by Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston. Cambridge, 33-52.

Lanser, Susan 1983: Toward a Feminist Narratology. In: Style 20, 341-363. 

Nünning, Ansgar 2000: Towards a Cultural and Historical Narratology. A Survey of Diachronic Approaches, Concepts, and Research Projects. In: Anglistentag 1999 Mainz: Proceedings. Ed. by Bernhard Reitz and Sigrid Rieuwerts. Trier, 345-373.

Patzig, Günther 1983: Ethik ohne Metaphysik. Göttingen.

Phelan, James/Martin, Mary Patricia 1999: The Lessons of ‘Weymouth’: Homodiegesis, Unreliability, Ethics, and The Remains of the Day. In: Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis. Ed. by David Herman. Columbus, 88-109.

Pieper, Annemarie 2000: Einführung in die Ethik. Tübingen/Basel.

Prince, Gerald 2005: On a Postcolonial Narratology. In: A Companion to Narrative Theory. Ed. by James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz. Malden, MA, 372-381.

Velleman, J. David 2000: The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford/New York.

Velleman, J. David 2006: Self to Self. Cambridge.

Wheater, Isabella 2004: Literature and Philosophy: Emotion and Knowledge? In: Philosophy 79, 215-245.

Tilmann Köppe

Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies

School of Language and Literature